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Introduction: 
The Middle East has rapidly opened up to various forms of new digital and televised media 
outlets. Scholars and journalists broadly agree that this proliferation of relatively new and 
continuously expanding consisting of satellite channels and the internet challenge the 
traditional hold of Arab states on information both entering and leaving their countries 
(Ghareeb, 2000: 2; Mellor & Rennawi & Dajani & Ayish, 2013: 5) . Some experts say that 
state media will be rendered obsolete in this era of high information, often attributing the 
mobilization of citizens in protest against their governments to social media and exposure 
to Western sources (Ghareeb, 2000: 2). It is only certain that it has forced Arab 
governments to take new forms of competition into account, and determine ways to 
regenerate their image for local audiences. 
Webster(1992: 2-3) defines state media as a means of mass communication which is 
“controlled financially and editorially by the state, not to be confused with public sector 
media which is “funded directly or indirectly by the state, but over which the state does not 
have tight editorial control.” State ownership of the media is typically found in non-
democratic and poor countries where governments have interest in controlling the flow of 
information (Djankov, 2002: 21), usually under control of a ministry of information. This 
research will tackle the question of state media’s sustainability in the information 
revolution, which Irving Fang (1997: 3-4) describes as mass communication involving 
“writing, printing, mass media, entertainment, media in the home, and the information 
highway”. He refers to it as a “revolution” because it entails “profound changes involving 
new means of communication that permanently affect entire societies, changes that have 
shaken political structures and influenced economic development, communal activity, and 
personal behavior” (Fang, 1997: 5). 
Revolution, in this sense, has similarly been shaping the Middle East since 2010 when the 
authority of Arab governments and its institutions, including the media, began to be 
challenged. This research will therefore explore the role of the state in controlling the flow 
of information to its people, and if the tactics used to this end thus far are justified. The core 
puzzle of this thesis is derived from annual media surveys conducted across the Middle 
East, which have revealed that the perception of credibility for state media has 
paradoxically either grown or remained steady among Arab nationals over the past several 
years despite a freer flow of information and the Arab Spring uprisings. To explain this 
phenomenon, it is necessary to explore the roots of all the factors involved. Therefore, this 
thesis discusses the foundations of media systems in the Arab world, including the state 
and regional formats. It proceeds to investigate the meaning and value of the concept of 
“media credibility”, and how this is subjectively constructed based on the circumstances 
which both the state and its citizens are enduring. This relationship between the two will 
be closely inspected through first-hand accounts via interviews, as well as more extensive 
4 
 
surveys on Middle Eastern countries backed by both scholarly and journalistic articles. This 
research will ultimately aim to answer the question: How does Arab state media manage to 
successfully maintain its claim to credibility despite alternative sources of information? It will 
also touch on the question of if there is an inherent problem with state-owned media 
claiming any real objectivity and legitimacy 
The Emergence and Evolution of State Media in the Arab World  
To understand the continued prominent role of Arab state media today, we must inspect its 
early roots. The emergence of Arab media derives from several interlinked political, social, 
and technological factors, where perhaps the common denominator can be traced back to a 
powerful force—Arab nationalism in the face of occupation and colonization. Its first 
manifestation came in demanding independence from the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th 
century, on the premise that countries from North Africa to the Arabian Gulf were 
connected by their common historical, cultural, and linguistic heritage (Smith, 1992: 220). 
From 1945 onwards, the press became the strongest weapon for expressing these beliefs in 
the struggle for national independence from the French and British, and the colonizers 
responded by imposing strict regulation and censorship on media in their mandated 
countries in fear of revolt. Journalists who promoted anti-colonialism and nationalism were 
severely punished for publicizing their views with prison, torture, and even exile.  
Following decolonization of Arab states, the need to construct a national identity thrust the 
call for freedom and individual rights into the background, and journalists who opposed 
this received much of the same treatment under Arab leaders (McFadden, 1953: 32). 
The pan-Arab ideology plateaued following the establishment of Israel in 1948 with many 
people and leaders in the region uniting to oppose the occupation, and launching the first 
state media to voice this. One of the most notable was Nasserist-era Egyptian “Sowt al 
Arab” (Voice of the Arabs) radio channel which was one of the first to shape the press 
culture of Arab state media in several countries in the region, most prominently those who 
had fought in or supported the 1967 Arab-Israeli war such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon 
among others (James, 2006) Secularist, anti-imperialist, anti-occupation speeches and 
songs echoed throughout the region 18 hours a day, much of it condemning other Arab 
states in the Gulf for their policies and lack of shared Arab sentiment. Leaders such as 
Gamal Abdel-Nasser maintained on these stations that states must be led with an iron fist 
to defeat enemies and maintain control over their own territory in the face of foreign threat 
(Olorunnisola & Douai, 2013: 189). ). As a result, the media discourse in those countries has 
to this day consistently been linked to political interest, because it first served the aims of 
the colonizers and later, the staunch nationalist culture which was born (McFadden, 1953: 
1). According to Noha Mellor (2005: 75-76), the news content and policies in these 
countries at the time reflected the political situation, with a great emphasis being placed on 
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politics, war, and economics reporting (hard news) over arts, entertainment, and lifestyle 
reporting  (soft news) in state media. Meanwhile, countries such as Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates who had been relatively stable and politically independent did not 
share the same press culture, rather using their mostly privately-owned but government 
regulated media to emphasize allegiance to the monarchy and adherence to the religious 
and social values of the country (Ayalon, 1995: 74).   
The Arab state media format was first challenged in the early 1990s, with the introduction 
of satellite television in the region. Initially, most of the media broadcast was Western, 
including news channels such as CNN. Although these channels only had English language 
broadcasts at the time, their style of reporting began to influence Arabic media in the 
region (Abdulla, 1991: 51). National news media across the Arab world began to mimic the 
style of reporting in order to make themselves appear, at least at first glance, modern and 
credible news sources (ibid). State media now had to compete with international, 
privatized news networks that had correspondents in the Middle East reporting on various 
issues and conflicts which it could previously censor. Rasha Abdulla (2007:56) says 
modernization of state news at this stage came in the form of adding more engaging and 
entertaining programs round-the-clock, being more timely and active in news reporting, 
and updating bulletin style and equipment where they could afford it. Indeed, finances 
played a large role in media capability and credibility. 
Gulf States also took notice of the influx of Western satellite channels, and sought to 
establish their presence in the region following the 1991 Gulf War, in which they had little 
to limited coverage on conflicts that hit close to home (Korany, 2011: 80). They established 
the first Pan-Arab channels such as Qatari Al-Jazeera in 1996, and Saudi Al-Arabiya in 2003. 
These channels, with budgets that dwarfed that of state media, were meant to compete 
directly with Western CNN and BBC. They attempted to replicate the varied, critical, and 
professional style of programming while catering to an Arabic speaking audience. However, 
despite several of these satellite channels claiming editorial independence, it is still widely 
believed that states are the main influencers of content and political leaning (Fandy, 2007: 
16). Particularly, Al-Jazeera is seen as being directed by the Qatari state, by some in the 
region who believe it is not critical of Qatari policies while it criticizes the policies of other 
Arab states and leaders (ibid). This belief has even been observed on a fellow state level; 
following criticism of the Jordanian monarchy on an Al-Jazeera program in 2002, Jordan 
recalled its ambassador to Qatar and closed the channel’s Jordanian offices of the network 
(Derhally, 2002).  
The most recent form of competition to state media, as well as pan-Arab media, came with 
the spread of the internet. Research by the Northwestern University in Qatar (NU-Q) 
(2015) showed that more Arabs are online now than ever. As the speed and spread of 
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internet increased, so did the consumption of news by the public. Social media became 
another tool to disseminate and consume information for the people, governments, and 
privately owned media. A countless amount of research has been done about the role of 
social media in fueling the Arab Spring revolutions, particularly in Egypt.  The next section 
will further explore the prominence of these developments.  
Establishing the Puzzle: A Return to the “State” 
When the Arab Spring erupted in countries across the Middle East, many predicted the 
revolutions would usher in a lesser dependency on local state media in countries across the 
region. However, the largest media surveys conducted in the Middle East have shown an 
interesting response and phenomenon taking place in attitudes towards national news 
media outlets. The latest annual online “Media Use in the Middle East” report conducted by 
NU-Q (2015) has revealed an interesting phenomenon taking place: between 2013 and 
2015, the people in countries which witnessed revolutions gave pan-Arab media the lowest 
level of ratings, and national media— including state controlled media—near highest. On 
the other hand, countries which have not undergone revolution hold a high opinion of pan-
Arab media (ibid). Still, the report showed that people across all the six countries surveyed 
in the 2015 report (Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Qatar) believed overall that the quality of news reporting in the Middle East had dropped 
since 2013, from 56 percent approval to 50 percent (ibid).  
Robb Barton Wood, director of strategic partnerships at NU-Q and one of the 
researchers on the survey, elaborated to PBS MediaShift that the survey suggested people 
had begun to reject pan-Arab content that promotes a more regional identity in favor of a 
more local or national relationship with the media (Paul, 2015). This growth of 
nationalistic sentiment is further evidenced by the fact that more than nine in ten 
respondents follow the media in Arabic (NU-Q, 2015). Wood says that this could be 
attributed to a greater quantity of Arabic news content available, but that “political and 
social context could also be a stimulus (Paul, 2015).  
The political and social context of consumption may be influenced by the findings which 
further revealed that most nationals of Arab countries believe that international media is 
biased against them, particularly in Arab Spring countries such as Egypt and Tunisia (NU-Q, 
2015). It may then seem natural that more people would turn to online news via social 
media to retrieve their information. Television, however, remained the single most popular 
news medium across all of the countries surveyed, and people who cited social media as an 
important source of news still expressed skepticism about the quality of information (ibid). 
This is perhaps an indication that the quality of the information received through social 
media is largely dependent on the associations made by the individual user, meaning that 
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there is no guarantee that internet users are better informed consumers of media, despite 
having the access at their fingertips.  
The research further found that 51 percent of respondents (compared to 34 percent in 
2013) supported freedom of speech in expressing political and ideological beliefs online 
(ibid). On the other hand, the percentage of people who believed that freedom of speech is 
acceptable and safe declined to 52 percent, down from 59 percent in 2013. The report 
stated that “while many respondents in Arab countries say the internet is a safe 
environment for one to air political speech — and they out strip many western countries in 
this conviction — they are less likely than those in other parts of the world to feel at ease 
talking about politics themselves” (ibid). This further suggests a “strong residual approval 
for censorship in certain areas, which have historically included religion, pornography and 
criticism of the rulers” (Peel, 2013). This can also reflect that the belief among Arabs that 
“autocracy could be benevolent and good for development, particularly at a time of 
instability and uncertainty in many states in the region” (ibid).  
Overall, of the 18 Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, Freedom 
House’s “Freedom of the Press” survey (2016) reports that 14 are considered non-free 
while three, including Lebanon, Kuwait, and Morocco, are only partly free. Tunisia is newly 
considered the only free country in the Arab world. The survey analysis indicates that 
although Arabs generally have less trust in the media-- whether state or private national, 
pan-Arab, or international—there is a trend of returning to state media consumption 
following the Arab uprisings. Here the question emerges: how does state media manage to 
successfully maintain its claim to credibility despite open sources of information? 
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Literature Review: Deconstructing Credibility 
Studies on media credibility in the Arab world have generally been scarce. Most studies 
(such as the ones being used in this research) have focused on viewership of regional or 
international media options (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; El-Nawawy, 2006). The credibility of 
Arab state media has been under criticism from its early foundations by journalists, 
activists, and organizations. However, little scholarly research has specifically tackled Arab 
state media and the question of its appeal and positioning in the Arab citizen’s news radar.   
Two theories exist with regard to government control over the media. Supporters cite the 
public interest (Pigouvian) theory, which maintains that state control over the media is 
desirable because the dissemination of information is a public good which is free from bias 
as reporting journalists are a part of this public (Djankov & McLeish & Nenova & Shleifer, 
2003:  341). This of course assumes that journalists act independently and responsibly by 
“self-censoring”. On the other hand, those who are critical of government ownership of the 
media subscribe to the public choice theory, which states that state-owned media 
undermines democratic institutions by favoring the ruling parties, intentionally 
manipulating and distorting information and thereby preventing the public from making 
informed decisions (ibid). But what is credibility in the media, and how is this constructed 
and judged?  
Scholars have identified two main dimensions in the complex construction of media 
credibility: source credibility and the application of journalism ethics (Hovland, Janis, & 
Kelley, 1993; Perkins, 2002). Source credibility focuses on the characteristics of the 
message source. Therefore, if the state is not viewed as being democratic or legitimate, its 
media will not be viewed as such either by the public. However, this judgment naturally 
depends on the audience consuming the media.  In authoritarian states, the argument for 
limited freedom of the press surrounds one main motivation: state preservation. Arab 
states have managed to instill a sense of “censorial culture” among both citizens and 
journalists through the idea of “responsible freedom”, which has allowed them to expand 
their control over media systems (Abdel Rahman, Abdel-Mageed, & Kamel, 1992). Hussein 
Amin (2002: 129) explains that this means that journalists working in state as well as 
privately owned media often practice self-censoring, which makes them “no different from 
the authoritarians who take on the role of the protectors of the state.  According to Amin 
(ibid), national security concerns in many Arab countries encompass anything that can be 
deemed a threat to ruling institutions and their interests which may include criticism of 
religion, ideology, or the struggle and values of Arab nationalism.  
Organizations such as Brussels-based International Federation of Journalists have sought 
to push for a universally recognized set of journalistic ethics. Michael Perkins (2002: 203) 
suggests a three pillar, basic universal set of journalism ethics. First and most important is 
the principle of independence, which means that journalism must be free of government 
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interference and censorship. The second principle is truth telling, meaning the news must 
be presented in a fair and balanced way without withholding information or being one 
sided. Third is responsible freedom, which dictates that journalists and media 
organizations should be acting in a way that restricts self-interest and promotes public 
interest. Perkins (2002: 204) defines the promotion of public interest as, “providing [the 
public] with news and information for self-governance and self-determination in a 
democratic society”.  
These elements appear to have limited capacity for implementation in Arab countries, 
given the differing political and social circumstances. Gordon Robison (2005: 4) argues that 
the idea that Western democratic values can be applied universally is a problematic notion 
in the Middle East as well as other parts of the world. As Mamoun Fandy(2007:  9) explains 
it, “in discussing Arab media ownership, the distinction between private and public state 
media, according to the models developed in Europe and the United States is of little 
analytical value” since in many parts of the Arab world today, “questions of ownership 
encompass economic, political, and family interests”. This adds several layers of complexity 
to the concept of media credibility as it stands in the West because it is “deeply entrenched 
and closely intertwined with local political, economic, and ideological interests, as well as 
the prevailing cultural norms, religious beliefs, and social fabric” (Shaer, 2015).  
Another limitation in employing Western democratic values to Arab state television 
journalists specifically, is that these journalists have limited autonomy, which therefore 
means that standards cannot thoroughly be applicable to them. Reich and Hanitzsch (2013: 
150) explain that “high professional autonomy among journalists corresponds with higher 
levels of press freedom and lower levels of state intervention in the media”. Generally in 
much of the Arab world, editors and journalists working for state media are legally 
classified as civil servants rather than autonomous professionals, working formally for the 
promotion of the government’s interests (UNESCO, 2014: 22).   
As earlier mentioned, pan-Arab media aimed to present itself as an alternative to national 
media. In reporting on the Arab anti-government revolts in the Middle East, several Pan-
Arab media channels took a hit to their credibility. From Tunisia to Bahrain, people 
expected these news stations to support their calls for democracy. According to Ali 
Hashem, (2012) it became increasingly clear that support of the revolutions in the Arab 
world was selective. This led to several journalists and employees resigning from the 
networks such as Al-Jazeera, and denouncing it for its lack of professionalism and clear 
bias. One such journalist is Hashem (2012), who wrote in an article for the Guardian that 
the credibility of Gulf-financed stations took a turn for the worst when they started to 
interfere with war coverage. Hashem recalled being forbidden to air footage showing 
gunmen fighting the Syrian regime on the Lebanese-Syrian border as it didn’t “fit the 
required narrative of a clean and peaceful uprising”.  Another former Al-Jazeera journalist, 
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Ghassan Ben Jeddo, went on to found an alternative pan-Arab news channel following his 
dismay at the state of the news reporting. Prominent Lebanese scholar and journalist As’ad 
Abu Khalil (2006) said that in applying this selectivity in news coverage, some Pan-Arab 
channels became “typical regime stations” and in this way pan-Arab satellite channels are 
over credited. Anthony Maalouf (2008: 34-35) notes that if there is one glaring similarity 
between state-run and pan-Arab channels, it is that both do not criticize the government of 
the state which they are based in. Instead, they use the claim of “editorial independence” to 
often openly be critical towards other countries and regimes.   
Generally, the presence of a ministry of information in a country is a clear indication that 
media is under close watch by the government, and this has been the case in all Arab 
countries at least at some point in time (Fandy, 2008: 11). Fandy (ibid) says the minister of 
information in each Arab regime makes it his job to shape the media’s content “by 
enforcing harsh laws backed up by imprisonment and physical violence”. But what are the 
goals of state media, and is it even concerned with credibility? The literature shows that 
Arab governments, aiming to maintain strong nationalistic feelings, will put more emphasis 
on concepts of social unity, harmony, and security. However, the proliferation of available 
content which is only growing is complicating this traditional hold on information (Fandy, 
2008: 12). The literature and surveys reviewed in this research do point toward the fact 
that the public largely does not trust information disseminated by the state, as evidenced 
by public demand for reform of state media during revolutions (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).  
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Methodology 
Through the review of literature, we can observe that the strongest shifts in public opinion 
on the media came following the Arab uprisings. Therefore, this research will focus on the 
period from which the uprisings first began in 2010 to the time of the latest available 
research done on the subject, 2016. A case study will be conducted on Egypt to further 
explore the topic presented. Egypt will be useful to study as the most populous country in 
the Middle East, which has throughout history been an important player in the 
development of media in the region. Currently, Egypt is still largely a point of interest for 
researchers and the media to debate, where the role of the state and citizen, security, and 
new and alternative media to name a few are being continuously analyzed in relation to the 
deposing of two leaders in this timeframe. Hence, a historical background will be given 
where necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the modern Egyptian context.  
This research largely depends on both qualitative and quantitative survey analysis, based 
on data found in media surveys conducted by institutes such as Northwestern University in 
Qatar (NU-Q), Freedom House, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as 
well as an individual study by researcher Naila Hamdy. To further interpret and enrich the 
data found in these secondary sources, qualitative first hand data will also be used in the 
form of interviews. The interviews have been conducted with ten Egyptians: nine 
consumers and one expert. Due to the researcher’s lack of proximity to all of the 
interviewees located in Egypt, face-to-face interviews were not possible and instead had to 
be conducted online via email and direct messaging.  
This method of research is referred to as “electronic interviewing”. According to Bampton 
& Cowton (2002: 3), the biggest advantage to this method of interviewing is that it permits 
the interviewee to carefully consider and construct a response to a particular question as it 
allows space for a delayed reply. The main disadvantage is that spontaneity of emotion or 
thought is not conveyed in the response (ibid). However, due to the informational rather 
than emotional nature of the research this should not be considered an impediment. 
Naturally, this study required a well-rounded sample of Egyptian people encompassing 
diverse ages and occupations, therefore interviewees were mainly found through the 
snowball sampling technique (also known as chain- referral) where existing study subjects 
recruit others from among their acquaintances for sociological or statistical studies where 
subjects are hard to locate (Babbie, 2007: 205).  Overall, all of the interviewees were 
located in Egypt’s capital of Cairo, their ages were between 22 and 45, and they held 
different occupations at varying education levels where some secondary school was the 
minimum. This group of course cannot be representative of all Egyptian people, but it does 
offer the possibility for complex and vastly varying insights in a group and location where 
interest in political expression is ripe. 
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After completing the interviews with the nine respondents, it was necessary to seek further 
analysis on the responses obtained. Therefore, prominent Egyptian Journalist and activist 
Hossam El-Hamalawy was contacted to offer commentary on the gathered interviews 
because of his extensive experience in the Egyptian and international media scene. He is 
currently an executive producer at AJ+, and has previously worked at Cairo Times, Al-Badil, 
The Los Angeles Times, and was a founding managing editor for Al-Masry Al-Youm's 
English Edition as well as Ahram Online.  
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Case Study:  
Egypt’s Media Landscape: 
Egypt is often cited as a media pioneer in the Middle East, having launched many of the 
region’s first and most influential forms of media (Shaer, 2015: 1). This happened following 
the 1952 Egyptian revolution in which Gamal Abdel Nasser came into power. The country’s 
political atmosphere was charged with highly nationalistic sentiments and hot political 
debates which were expressed through the media in newspapers, cinema, and radio 
(Hamoush, 1989). This revolutionary era was rich in cultural and intellectual diversity, as it 
created a high demand for writers, poets, and thinkers to contribute to the media scene, 
which shaped the Egyptian media into the prominent role it still has today in the region 
(Khamis, 2011: 1160). Egypt was the first Arab country to introduce the printing press, and 
today has the region’s largest publishing center. In 1998, Egypt also became the first Arab 
and African nation to launch its own satellite. Today, there are more than 500 Egyptian 
newspapers, journals, magazines, and other periodicals, far surpassing the number 
available in the majority of countries in the Middle East (Freedom House, 2015).  
At the center of Egypt’s vast media empire is the Egyptian Radio and Television Union 
(ERTU) which runs Maspero, the country’s media broadcaster. ERTU, which currently has 
16 TV channels and 14 radio stations with a staff of 35,000 employees, had previously been 
operated directly by the Egyptian government through the now defunct Ministry of 
Information. Egypt also has an abundance of privately owned media newspapers and 
satellite television channels. The Egyptian government’s (as with Arab governments across 
the region) control over them takes on various forms such as ownership, funding, licensing 
regulations, and even appointing key media figures (Shaer, 2015: 6).  
The government’s increasingly tight regulations over the media are reflected in annual 
Freedom House “Freedom of the Press” reports, which indicate press freedom has 
increasingly declined between 2010 and 2016. Whereas the country was previously 
considered “partly free” with ranking of 60/100, it has now dropped to a “not free” status 
with a ranking of 77/100 (Freedom House, 2010 & Freedom House, 2016). Since the 2010 
Egyptian revolution, the state of the country’s media overall has been turbulent following 
the deposing of two heads of state, one autocratic ruler and the other democratically 
elected. Although heavily restricted, Egypt’s media landscape still witnessed its major 
points of development under now deposed leader Hosni Mubarak, who ruled the country 
from 1981 to 2011. This includes the emergence of media privatization and growth of 
internet accessibility, which allowed opposition satellite, print, and online news to develop 
(Khamis, 2011: 1166). However, this private opposition media was still kept in line as 
“arrests and abuse of journalists—police assaults and raids, detentions, even torture”—
took place (Rugh, 2014: 156). The election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, 
Mohammed Morsi, carried promise of reform for Mubarak’s suppressive media policies.   
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Shortly following Morsi’s election, the ministry of information was abolished by the newly 
elected cabinet in an attempt to show a move towards press freedom and transparency 
(Selim, 2014). However, despite being democratically elected, a large part of the reason for 
Morsi’s downfall was ultimately that he did not come through on promises for media 
liberalization, instead continuing to crack down on media and groups which did not agree 
with him, as Mubarak did before him (ibid). Furthermore, private and state media were 
openly unsupportive of Morsi’s leadership to the time of his ouster in 2013. Indeed, the 
media appeared to have made attempts to undercut him at several opportunities, running 
headlines such as “Send Morsi to the Moon” (Al-Ahram Weekly, 2013), and “The President 
and the Army: Public Solidarity Does Not Conceal Private Struggle” (Al-Ahram, 2012). This 
shows an exceptional circumstance where state media was not loyal to its country’s leader, 
and certainly reflects some of the conditions under which the military coup in Egypt was 
possible, bringing Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi into power (Kirkpatrick & El Shiekh, 2012).  
In 2014, ERTU issued a statement that media figures must “realize their national 
responsibility and support the army in its fight against terrorism” (Soliman, 2014) 
Subsequently, the editors of 17 prominent state and privately owned newspapers such as 
Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Shorouk, Al-Watan, Al-Wafd, and Youm7 announced that they would 
change their follow a “more responsible” approach to back the state in its “war on terror”. 
The editors vowed to implement a new policy in which they would refrain from criticizing 
the army or state, and publishing material which may incite terrorism (ibid). Only a few 
private newspapers such as Al-Dostour, Daily News Egypt, and Al-Badil (literally meaning 
“the alternative”) refused to reform due to fear of Egypt turning to a “state of war media”. 
Al-Badil’s editor in chief described a future in which journalists will have transformed into 
“informers for the security forces” through what is interpreted as “an official declaration of 
the nationalization of press freedom in the country, which will lead to more censorship and 
restrictions” (Youssef, 2014).  
The new Egyptian constitution drafted in 2014 under Sisi appeared at first to have several 
progressive provisions. Article 65 guarantees freedom of opinion and expression; articles 
68 through 72 all concern the rights of the press, such as access to all official state 
documents, the right to establish new media outlets, bans on media censorship, and a 
declaration of the neutrality and editorial independence of state owned media outlets 
(Rozgonyi, 2015: 16-17). However, ambiguity and exceptions are also heavily present 
within these provisions. Article 71 authorizes censorship “in times of war or general 
mobilization”. This same article which guarantees that imprisonment for media offences 
will be eliminated also states that those who commit “crimes related to the incitement of 
violence, discrimination between citizens, or impingement of individual honor” will be 
prosecuted (ibid). Furthermore, various other articles from the Mubarak era concerning 
public order can still incriminate journalists under article 71, such as “exploiting religion in 
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spreading, either by words, in writing or in any other means, extreme ideas for the 
purposes of inciting strife, ridiculing or insulting [the Abrahamic faiths] or a sect following 
it, or damaging national unity” (Freedom House, 2016). Paris-based Reporters Without 
Borders (2016) reported that since the “Sisification” of the media began in 2013, 27 
journalists have been arrested. The constitution further stipulates that there will be an 
independent media regulator in the place of the defunct ministry of information, but this 
has yet to be established as of 2016 (Freedom House, 2016).  
The three presidents discussed have much in common in terms of leadership and media 
policies. Although choices in media might increase, unless the people trust a specific 
medium this array of choice will have a limited impact on political views since “mistrust of 
the media can lead to non-consumption” (Johnson & Kaye, 1998; Kiousis, 2001). As earlier 
mentioned, the role of social media with regard to the Egyptian 2010 uprisings has been 
heavily discussed, with many crediting it as the main mobilizer of people against 
oppressive regimes. It is relevant to the topic of credibility because it has become a way for 
people to get around having to follow either satellite or state media, especially as internet 
penetration in Egypt has skyrocketed as the general public took notice of a medium which 
had been almost exclusively used by urban youth (Lim, 2012). Yet despite this penetration 
of internet and the proliferation of social media and citizen journalism, statistics show that 
consumption of state media has paradoxically risen. The next section will attempt to 
explain this phenomenon. 
Media Consumption in Egypt  
A survey for the Global Media Journal was conducted mainly with residents of Cairo in 
order to assess the Egyptian peoples’ media credibility perceptions in the pre-election 
transitional period between the presidencies of Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi 
(Hamdy, 2013). There are three key findings in this survey that are important to this case 
study. First, television as a medium was rated highest in credibility, followed by 
newspapers and the internet. Second, the survey revealed that among highly educated 
Egyptians, the internet and its online newspapers and news portals via social media 
networks like Facebook were rated the highest for credibility. However, among less 
educated and less wealthy Egyptians, state media continued to have high credibility 
ratings. Third, when respondents reported their political activities and interests, only 10.9 
percent said they were “very interested” in politics, while the majority were either “not 
interested” (36.7 percent) or “not interested at all” (37.4 percent).    
At the time when this survey was conducted in 2011, the amount of people living under the 
poverty line in Egypt was reported to be 25.2 percent, and the number of people who 
depended on government subsidies to obtain their food necessities numbered 71 million 
out of a population of 90 million, according to the Egyptian Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). As of 2015, this number has soared to 27.8 percent. 
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In addition, the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) latest annual Human 
Development Report (2015) revealed that Egypt’s mean years of schooling were 6.4 years 
and the adult literacy rate was 74 percent, while internet users amounted to 31 percent of 
the population.  
In relation to media attitudes and habits, NU-Q’s survey (2015) further shows that people 
are less comfortable with political expression in post-revolutionary Arab countries such as 
Tunisia and Egypt. Whereas in Tunisia the survey findings say that there was the biggest 
drop in people who believed they were safe in expressing their political thoughts, it 
reported that in Egypt the authorities did not permit for the question to be asked to the 
people at all. The fact that an opportunity for people to express their opinions on political 
expression was prohibited strongly suggests that the Egyptian government still has a tight 
hold on information which can flow in and out of the country. This is further evidenced by 
the fact that Egyptians also had less faith that the internet could increase one’s political 
influence (ibid).  
From reviewing these surveys, we can observe that there are certain socio-economic and 
political factors which affect media consumption patterns. Continued government 
persecution of online rights activists in Egypt since 2013 may have had a chilling effect on 
beliefs of the internet’s political utility. After years of turmoil, crackdowns, and tough 
coverage, Egyptians hold negative views of many news media. The next section of this 
research will further probe at the impact of these conditions.  
Voice of the Egyptians 
In order to get impressions from Egyptians living in their country about this issue, nine 
Egyptians were asked four questions, and the majority gave their original responses in 
Arabic. A select few insightful and informational excerpts have been translated for this case 
study, and will be accompanied by the age and occupation of the respondents. After 
compiling these replies, an analysis of them will be conducted, supplemented by media 
practioner Hossam El-Hamalawy. The following questions will be asked: 
 Question 1: Do you trust state media news; why or why not?  
 According to NU-Q’s media survey, Egyptian trust in state media is generally 
low but still surpasses that of other countries which have not witnessed 
revolution. The answers provided here can offer more detailed insight into the 
perception of state media, and the general attitude towards it. 
 Question 2: Do you still view state media to get your news and why? 
 Hamdy’s research concluded that those at a lower socioeconomic level are 
more likely to consume state media, but did not probe at its overall value and 
use to different segments of the population. This question therefore deals with 
choice. After the general perception towards state media has been established, 
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it is crucial to this study to know if they still make a conscious decision to 
consume it, and for what purpose.  
 Question 3: How has your attitude changed towards the media reporting on Egypt 
before the revolution in 2010 compared to now? 
 As observed in the Hamdy’s (2013) survey, there are more people who say that 
they are uninterested in media reporting. This question therefore allows us to 
briefly look at the political and social process that may have caused this, and 
how it might have affected perception of credibility.   
 Question 4: What is your most preferred news medium and source? 
Sub question: How do you feel about pan-Arab media outlets? (Al-Jazeera, Al-
Arabiya, etc..) 
 The fourth question is of interest to determine what individuals deem a 
credible source to turn to regularly for the most accurate version of the truth 
in their view. In line with question 4, a sub question was asked to probe at the 
reason why (according to the NU-Q survey) Egyptians had little trust in pan-
Arab media outlets and possibly link this to state media consumption.  
 
Trust in Egyptian state media was low, with all ten of the correspondents replying that they 
had little to no trust in Egyptian state media, with many expressing awareness that it is the 
“mouthpiece of the government”. One interviewee explains:  
“[State media] is completely biased. I support a secular state which I believe Sisi is trying to achieve. But state 
media has been trying to convince us that the Muslim Brotherhood is the ultimate evil and they are terrorists 
to the Egyptian people and I think this is unfair. In Egypt we are 90 million people constantly in a cycle of 
demonizing and alienating those who we don’t agree with in our country. Of course state media is one sided 
and undemocratic.” (23, university student) 
Despite the little trust towards state media that was reported, the majority of interviewees 
replied that they still check it as a source of information, but not exclusively. Here, we can 
also observe a correlation between social/financial status and consumption of state media 
as indicated in Hamdy’s research, where some citizens view it for practical purposes as 
others view it as only one source of information: 
“I don’t care about politics in state news; I view it to find out more straightforward things. I check 
[newspaper] Al-Gumhouria and [television] Nile News everyday  if I need to know about gas and food prices, 
power cuts, dangerous areas to avoid etc..” (40, private car driver) 
This further highlights the large wealth gap between Egyptians that exists today. The more 
educated and financially secure interviewees near unanimously responded that if they 
chose to consume state media, they only considered it one source among many for news. 
However, similar to those on the lower socioeconomic level, it appeared that these people 
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still viewed it for a specific purpose. The aim remained to directly access the particular 
position that the government holds on various issues: 
“It’s just a fact that every kind of media, state or private, will only give me one version of the truth. I still need 
to know my government’s version even if I don’t agree with it.” (29, Pharmacist) 
Overall, the interviewees were dismayed at the state of mainstream media reporting on 
Egypt, Some expressed the view that the need for stability in Egypt should be reflected in 
news coverage: 
“Everyone has always had an agenda which showed [during the revolutions]. They are either with the safety 
and security of Egypt or they are against it and I think we know who those people are now.” (42, small 
business owner) 
This statement can partly give insight into the reason why Egyptians surveyed by NU-Q 
(2015) increasingly felt that there was a media bias against their country: that perhaps 
they hold different views of what the role of the media during conflict should be. Others 
described their interest and optimism towards the media peeking during the revolution, 
but later subsiding as they appeared to lose hope of tangible change: 
“Before the revolution I wasn’t interested because everything was the same, business as usual. Then there 
was real hope for change in the revolution and I joined the protests in Tahrir Square and took videos and 
watched the news all the time. At this point I honestly feel like we went in a big and bloody circle right back to 
where we were, except that the news reporting on Egypt is negative from most stations, especially in Arabic. I 
try to avoid [the news] most of the time unless it’s something necessary.” (32, video producer) 
If Egyptians feel increasingly pessimistic about the state of the media, what are the outlets 
they feel comfortable with? All of the interviewees below the age of 35 credited social 
media as their main news source in some form, favoring the amount of control they had 
over the content they saw.  
“I always go on Facebook or Twitter if I want news. I get the information much quicker and nobody can 
control what is said there” (26, Accountant) 
They further all had generally negative opinions towards pan-Arab media: 
Everybody knows Al Jazeera is owned by the Qataris and Al-Arabiya by the Saudis and its rumored that both 
are being funded by Israel since the 90’s so I don’t think any Egyptian believes that. I go to CNN or BBC 
usually if I want news.” (26, secretary) 
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Findings and Analysis 
The interviews conducted have, as predicted,  highlighted the deep skepticism felt towards 
all media, but have also shown the complexity involved in answering the research question 
of this thesis. This is because they have revealed that the reason for this skepticism 
revolves around a wide spectrum of conflicting views that different segments of the 
Egyptian population hold. On this spectrum was the support one held for the government, 
and the value that one assigned to national security and stability versus freedom of the 
press and expression. Possible trends that were observed here concern the socioeconomic 
status of the interviewees and their media consumption habits.  
The lack of trust widely expressed towards state media suggests an essential mistrust of a 
government which is perceived as being undemocratic and suppressive. Hossam El-
Hamalawy attributes this to a consistent discourse of state media in Egypt through the 
presidencies of Mubarak, Morsi, and Sisi which “the people have memorized”. It has been 
focused on “terror threat, security, and the inevitability of chaos if [the leaders] were 
deposed.” Although some of the interviewees described mostly supporting the secularism 
of the government, they still opposed its actions against those who critique it.  The common 
theme observed through these responses was a sense of powerlessness and general 
lethargy towards the political and social state of Egypt.  
The responses obtained from the interviews indicate that people had different motivations 
for viewing state media. While some said that they consumed it for information on practical 
day-to-day needs, others responded that it was just one source to them. State media 
appears to be understood and valued by all interviewees as a clear partisan media in the 
country rather than as an objective provider of truth. For this reason, El-Hamalawy said he 
personally does not believe that Egyptians are more inclined to watch state media than 
other kinds of national media to get their information. He said that “the contrary has 
happened”. When asked to elaborate,  El-Hamalawy said that state media has generally 
been lagging behind in the development needed to compete with other sources of media, 
and following “the failure of the Arab Spring”, it is as tightly monitored as it was prior to 
2010 which no longer appeals to Egyptian viewers.  
He says that there is another player in the field that has adapted the tools necessary in the 
interest of states: the privately-owned media outlets which are close to the ruling regimes 
and security forces. He explains that there has been an “the influx of newspapers and 
satellite channels that are owned by businessmen, who have interests close to those of the 
ruling bureaucracy and security services”. El-Hamalawy specifically mentions Youm7, Sada 
el-Balad and television channel CBC as a few examples of media which is “owned by 
corrupt businessmen from the Mubarak era, who are today in Sisi's camp”. These private 
national media outlets disseminate a message that follows the regime's agenda, but with a 
"cleverer" and more "tech savvy" approach than Al-Ahram or Maspero, making them more 
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successful in utilizing social media tools and satellite technologies to project their 
messages. Naturally, when the majority of the mainstream media in the country supports 
the government, it becomes difficult to avoid. An article in Foreign Policy (Chenoweth, 
2016) explains that in this case, people turn to social media for more information and 
greater freedom where it is looked at as a “boon for grassroots social and political 
movements”. El-Hamalawy’s point also indicates that Egyptians are not solely dependent 
on state media for their information, and indeed have many local sources to turn to. 
Egyptian private media’s announcement of allegiance to the state and Sisi has therefore 
greatly benefitted the state, which now does not need to rely solely on itself and its own 
resources to disseminate its messages. This in turn can be viewed as being more credible 
by viewers because it is not directly associated with the state format. Therefore, even if the 
average Egyptian is not explicitly consuming state media, he is still most likely consuming 
state aligned and/or funded media protecting the state’s interests.  
The UNDP (2015) report previously mentioned that only 31 percent of Egyptians are 
online, and it is therefore evident that the majority of people simply do not access the open 
and varied sources of information that the internet holds. It has, however, been an 
important and effective tool for the state to suppress political expression (Chenoweth, 
2016). El-Hamalawy agrees with reports that the Egyptian government in this case has 
majorly been targeting those who openly support the Muslim Brotherhood, as this group 
constitutes a major security threat in the eyes of both the government and the people.  
The interviews suggest that there is indeed an emphasis being placed on the stability and 
security of the country by the citizens. El-Hamalawy believes that there is “a lot of ill feeling 
and mistrust towards others now” which caused people to become less tolerant of others 
who do not represent their viewpoint. It appears that after drawn out conflicts in Egypt as 
well and throughout the region, people are now more polarized than ever. El-Hamalawy 
explains that people “counterintuitively” become less likely to seek out different media, and 
instead become a loyal audience to the media that suits their position. For this reason he 
says it is “completely understood” that Egyptians would have negative feelings towards 
pan-Arab media.  
El-Hamalawy attributes the particular mistrust towards these channels to the turbulent 
political relations that these Egypt has had with Qatar and Saudi Arabia who apply their 
agendas to Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya respectively. Mutual interests have “zigzagged on 
occasions” and were reflected in the coverage of events and politics in Egypt, which did not 
go unnoticed. With regard to Al-Jazeera specifically, El-Hamalawy said that state-run media 
continuously demonized it since its launch during the Mubarak-era, as well as after Sisi’s 
military coup when it “blindly followed the Muslim Brothers' discourse”. He further 
emphasized that it was important to admit that Al-Jazeera has “enjoyed a positive image in 
the eyes of local Egyptians” at brief times during the coverage of the second Palestinian 
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intifada, the US-led wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, the Israeli war in Lebanon in 2006, and 
the initial phase of the Arab Spring in 2011.  
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Conclusion 
Within the time and space allowed for this research, it is important to acknowledge that 
there were limitations in the number of interviewee responses which could be directly 
quoted in the case study, as well as in the researcher’s personal access to varied 
respondents within Egypt and in other Arab countries. This research has laid groundwork 
for further in depth studies on other Arab countries, which are currently scarce or non-
existent, often in large part due to government restrictions on surveying. The case of Egypt 
has, however, offered valuable insight into the dynamics of state media credibility in a 
country where the people have repeatedly called for a change in the system, whatever they 
may consider this change to mean. It is through these findings in the research that it has 
been determined that state media has successfully maintained a claim to credibility based 
on (i) the intentions of the state, and (ii) the people’s perception towards the state.  
Arab state media is primarily concerned with maintaining order and security in the 
country, as well as providing information on the government’s positions and actions 
towards any given issue or event. It therefore does not aim or claim to have the impartiality 
or bipartisanship that is attached to credibility in reporting, but rather the maintained full 
support of the people which has become increasingly fragile since the Arab uprisings 
began. Despite removing two leaders in hopes of greater freedom of expression, the media 
situation of Egypt remains comparable to war-torn Syria according to Freedom House data 
(2015) which still retains its government. Whereas it was not possible to obtain access to a 
state media journalist in Egypt for comment, a Syrian state media journalist (personal 
communication, December 27, 2016) explained that the role of state media is to inform the 
people of what the government is doing and in the current situation “we cannot afford to 
not be communicating with the people for the sake of [the government’s] good as well as 
[the people’s].” This statement highlights the fact that the role of state media in a conflict 
perhaps becomes even more important than in times of peace, acting as a lifeline for both 
governments and people.  
As state media’s target audience is the citizens of its own country, judgment on whether it 
is a credible source of news essentially rests with these consumers depending on the local 
situation in a given time and place. The interviews have helped to support Hamdy’s (2013) 
survey which showed that this majority consists of those on a lower socio-economic level, 
due to their little access to alternatives and their preference for informational rather than 
political content.  People of higher income and education have been shown to still consume, 
but also seek out other forms of media for information; therefore it is far from obsolete. 
The pan-Arab media scene, on the other hand, seemingly failed in the eyes of those 
interviewed to produce an objective alternative.   
The phenomenon of favoring state security over free speech is not unique to the Arab 
world. A survey conducted in Russia indicated that although the majority of people (57 
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percent) said that they wanted to live in a democratic state, 70 percent believed that there 
was no need for freedom of speech or independent media outlets while 60 percent said 
they favored a planned economy and a further 54 percent believed that the country’s 
security agencies should have the right to bypass the law to protect the country (Goble, 
2016). A similar survey has not yet been conducted in the Middle East, but research such as 
this indicates that there are different priorities and perceptions amongst people in the 
world—and  people living under authoritarian governments will also come to value issues 
such as security and social harmony over freedom of the press.  
State media was likely more effective in its goals before the information revolution of the 
1990s. Ghareeb (2000: 396) explains that although the information revolution has taken 
hold in the Middle East, it is still an “elitist” idea that is mainly accessed by the “well-to-do 
and the well-educated” and in the countries which the Arab revolutions have taken place, 
there is a greater class and education gap than there was before making it less effective. As 
the research has shown, the state, its collaborators, and supporters will often be better at 
utilizing the tools and mediums to undermine civilian or activist causes and concerns. 
A lack of state media does not necessarily indicate that an Arab country is more stable or 
democratic. Lebanon is one of these countries where nearly all news channels are owned 
by political and religious parties with conflicting interests, and continuous local and 
international political strife. Here we should ask if state media be abolished entirely, or if it 
should develop itself further to be able to compete with private news networks both 
domestically and internationally. Ultimately, the approach taken depends on whether one 
subscribes to public choice or public interest theories. Is the problem with state media in 
and of itself, or is the problem rather that it is used by undemocratic states? Until further 
progression or escalation towards Arab democratic reform is pushed there will be 
authoritarian states with state media, and as long as there are supporters of the state there 
will be privately owned media that support it.  
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